Chelsea's CSR Report: A Critical Analysis

The CSR report is a downloadable, glossy colour document that is structured fairly typically, as such reports go, in that it contains conventional chapter titles with a business and PR diction: Executive Summary, Strategic CSR Model, Stakeholders, etc.

The various Chelsea Football Club (CFC) affiliated programmes carried out over 2005/06 which the club choose to include in the report, predominantly irrespective of size, are allocated to chapters and ordered on the basis of their uniqueness to the club. This approach is an interesting structural choice, and one that becomes rapidly apparent due to the term’s initial repetition, followed by a gradual waning further into the report.

As an editorial decision, it leads and contributes to several broader themes that volunteer possible aims and intentions behind the CSR report’s production: what CFC hope to achieve in terms of managing and enhancing their reputation, and the environmental and professional context within which that reputation management occurs.

What emerge are three cornerstone themes when considering CFC’s awareness and action regarding reputation, image and identity. Firstly, the stock placed in uniqueness. Secondly, an awareness of the club’s current place and image in the football world, and peer relations therein. Thirdly, a clear alignment of the club with the arena of big business.

4.2.1 Report Introduction

Table 2: From ‘Foreword by Peter Kenyon.’

‘Welcome to Chelsea Football Club’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report for 2005/06, which was our Centenary year.’

‘This document is not only the first of its kind for Chelsea FC, but we also believe it is the first time a top football club has drawn together and presented all of its work under the CSR banner.’

‘Chelsea is committed to CSR because we understand the social, economic and environmental impact of our business.’

The three excerpts in the above table highlight some early, interesting features regarding organisational intention and image projection, through analysis of presentation and rationalisation, all becoming increasingly prevalent further into the document.

The very first sentence in the report (the section’s title aside, which I will discuss shortly) does not hesitate to remind the reader, through its syntax and with fairly blatant sentence end-focus, that it was CFC’s centenary.

This is merely a statement of fact, but it suggests a promotional mindset and awareness of the potential for promotional synergy. Centenaries are an opportunity, by definition, for big clubs to promote as well as celebrate, because they enjoy a greater share of the limelight for a limited time. This awareness is exemplified by its immediate inclusion in the text.

The highlighting of the report’s uniqueness in the second paragraph - not only for CFC but in all of football - and under the ‘CSR banner’, intimates an awareness on CFC’s role in what is a new phenomena in the football world (formalisation of such practice through the CSR staple).

It also projects an identity of the club as breakthrough leaders in their operational domain, bringing formalised CSR to football, explaining in a simple, conventional, almost stereotypical manner - as if to an audience that, like football, has never heard of the term before - the rationale behind their commitment to this cause.

4.2.2 Ideology

The following bulleted statements from the report’s Executive Summary establish the rationale behind CFC’s activities. They are delivered simply and forthrightly, utilising business diction (‘best practice’, ‘benchmarks for the future’, ‘engaging our stakeholders’). They are also expressed through emotive lexis, especially in the first instance (‘strive’, ‘the right thing to do’), and humanised through repetition of the collective pronoun ‘we’.

· because we believe it is the right thing to do
· because we strive for best practice
· because we consult, communicate with and engage our stakeholders
· and because we want to set benchmarks for the future

Table 3: From ‘Foreword by Peter Kenyon’

‘When children play, the world wins.’

‘We want Chelsea to be seen as a social leader, as well as an industry leader, through an identifiable series of programmes that create a legacy at home and abroad.’

‘We believe football clubs, of all corporates, have a unique power through their global reach and their ability to act as role models in key areas such as health, fitness and education that are critical to the development of society generally.’

‘It is easy to forget that business and society are interdependent, the well-being of one is dependent on the well-being of the other.’

‘Our social responsibility is not driven by profit. Activity is carried out and supported by the club, the management, the players and the fans. All key stakeholders are engaged.’

The foreword’s evocative, potent title – ‘When children play, the world wins’ - utilises juxtaposition and parallelism to great rhetorical effect. It is the first of many instances of CFC’s ideological voice.

Establishing image and identity as a form of moral philosophy can be a source of competitive advantage for organisations (Barney and Stewart (2000, p. 36), not least in enhancing relationships with constituents who perceive doing good as a precursor to doing well (Fombrun, 1996, p. 127).

The club’s stated desire (in Table 3) to be seen as a social leader and create a legacy projects strong, moral and honourable images of an organisation that, moreover, has genuine motives in carrying out socially responsible practice. It is also presentation of an organisation that is seen to understand its obligation, by its own admission, that football clubs, of all business, have the unique power to (and so should) make a difference. As such, it correlates well with Prof. Stephen Morrow’s views on club responsibilities:

‘Clubs need to live up to their social status and recognise that it places obligations upon them as well as providing them with benefits. They need to be accountable for their social activities and actions.’

This positive image of the club is further augmented by a more grounded tone when accepting that more could be done, ‘We do not believe this is a perfect document. It will mature and develop over time’. It is an important inclusion. The attempt to create the illusion of flawlessness, perfection or completeness is highly problematic when an organisation reports its CSR activity. It implies a degree of organisational immunity, and risks compromising the integrity of the work (Surma, 2005, p. 120). This is because, by definition of socially responsible and charitable work, more can always been done and many problems cannot be solved with a few brush strokes of goodwill.

It is unfortunate then that, however conversationally it is relayed to the reader (and so, in effect, to society), the interdependence and necessarily mutual well-being of business and society is deemed ‘easy to forget’.

This implies a degree of institutional malaise, negatively contrasting talk of commitment. It also somewhat undermines the perception of CFC as an organisation that carries out CSR because it understands the social, economic and environmental impact of its business, or one that is always aware of its obligations.

We are assured that ‘All key stakeholders are engaged’. However, interestingly, the Engaging Our Stakeholders section of the report expresses openly and, if you are a CFC fan, quite unconvincingly, that ‘it is difficult to argue against fans being the main stakeholders’.

While this view does not dismiss fans, and while both statements are not directly at odds with one another, it does not portray CFC as a club that staunchly considers its fans to be a top priority, or its key stakeholders. The latter is something the vast majority of supporters of any club would consider themselves to be. Moreover the statements, set alongside each other, create some confusion over the identity of these key stakeholders whom we are assured are fully engaged.

4.2.3 The CSR Model


Table 4: From ‘Chelsea’s CSR Model’

‘Chelsea have done this because we are proud of the work we have already done and we want to communicate that to all our stakeholders; because we strive for best practice in every area of our business; and because we want to set benchmarks for ourselves for improvement year on year.’

‘CSR is an integral part of our vision. That vision, which runs through the club, is that by 2014 we want to be recognised internationally as the world’s number one football club.’

‘For us this is an exercise in demonstrating our community and stakeholder commitment, the transparency of our business and to set ourselves standards for the future.’

‘We will consider bringing our CSR report into line with those FTSE 100 companies, 80 percent of whom employ specialist CSR directors (Marketing, 2006) which is a measure of the importance of this sector in the modern corporate world.’

‘These [programmes] should focus primarily on our immediate local community but also reflect the ambitions of Chelsea globally.’


CFC’s detailed presentation and rationalisation of their CSR model is presented explicitly as another aspect of their business, without evidence of the previous ideological views and moral sentiment.

Here the club keenly promotes the sensibility, practicality and business acumen at the planning stage of their initiatives, complimenting their overall vision.

This is part of the report where CFC’s alignment with, and adoption of, a business mindset is most evident. This is articulated through specific business register and context. Well-conceived CSR initiatives are clearly linked to the club’s prosperity and presented as means of attaining it, while programmes designed to meet community needs also double as tools that aid CFC in meeting its ambition of becoming the number one club in the world in seven years. Evidently, there is some variance in presentation and rationalisation compared to earlier in the report.

Reference to the financial markets and multinationals therein, that the club ‘comfortably meet two well-established models of measuring CSR’, and the comparison of investment with national GDP’s all point to a sporting organisation that wishes to be taken seriously in conventional business, and judged alongside and legitimised by the activities and norms in the ‘modern corporate world’.


4.2.4 Political Football

Table 5: References and allusions to political interference

‘It is also important at these times of political interference within European football that Premier League clubs demonstrate together that the interests of key stakeholders and the wider community are a major part of what we do.’

‘Cynics might say that CSR is a way of self-regulation to ward off government interference, a way of picking up cheap PR points or that it is expected that football should do “good”.’

‘But at Chelsea we do it because we believe fundamentally that it is the right thing to do, not because it is expected.’

‘Programmes are not geared to earn recognition, although this can be a positive offshoot, but can stand alone should the ‘conscience’ of the club be examined or scrutinised internally.’


In response to questioning concerning which factors football clubs were most aware of when managing their reputations, Prof. Morrow listed:

‘that their business means that they are always news; lack of control over key aspects of the business (e.g. results, employee behaviour to name but two); interdependence with their competitors; presence of external regulators such as the FA, UEFA; stakeholder irrationality at times (e.g. supporters, directors).’

The excerpts in Table 5 shed considerable light on some of the concerns of CFC regarding reputation and image, especially regarding what Morrow describes as ‘external regulators’.

It is undeniably a somewhat mysterious, quizzical, yet fascinating part of the document that bears significantly on any understanding of how CFC use the report, the image the club intends to project, how it does so, and how well it correlates as a whole.

The first tabulated sample in Table 5 quite clearly denotes the potential for outside political interference into European football clubs as an instigator for engaging in and promoting socially responsible activity. The second excerpt then appears to label those who are of the opinion that such activity is a method of defence against political interference as cynics.

It seems to suggest CFC have chosen to use the document as a stage for self-defence or, at least, a legitimatizing voice, to answer what the club sees as certain negative questions that are assumed to be posed of its actions. This largely works to the detriment of the CSR report as a whole, in terms of perceived organisational intention and sincerity, and so the overall timbre of the report (appearing as it does at the very beginning). This is because it explicitly associates socially responsible behaviour by businesses with currying political favour.

The effect is repeated when, after insisting that CSR programmes are carried out because ‘we fundamentally believe it is the right thing to do, not because it is expected’, it is intimated that such programmes can aid the club in standing alone should the organisation’s ‘conscience’ come under investigation.

4.2.5 Competition and Rivalry

Throughout the report there are various instances where the organisational context of CFC as being a leading actor in the professional football club domain becomes significantly evident.

When rationales are outlined and initiatives presented, the culture of competition, rivalry and the perceived need for deliberate differentiation from peers - which is at the heart of the professional football world - is articulated through the report. It says much about the target audience of the document, how the club wishes to be perceived and compared to whom.

Table 6: Views and rationales concerning various initiatives

‘When we were developing our strategy we believed it was important to actively create schemes separate to those which the majority of Premiership clubs were involved with.’

‘We wanted to work with a children’s charity, but not one that already had a high national profile or established football relationships.’

‘Lastly in terms of other global initiatives, these would also be based around a unique approach. Unlike most football clubs, we were not looking to take the money and run in key business markets.’

‘We would seek legacy partners locally, this would help our business generally, but also ensure we left something tangible behind.’

On CFC’s programme in Asia

‘The deal is not financially led.’

“We are not in this to get players cheap or just to come on tours. In all our discussions we have made it clear that Chelsea’s philosophy in our target markets is not to take the money and run.’”

‘Hammam, … who has been critical of big European clubs coming on lucrative tours to Asia and leaving nothing behind, agreed it was a unique partnership.’


The importance of uniqueness is again heralded, but the club also state, in no uncertain terms, that they deliberately plan initiatives and create schemes that do not involve other football clubs. To put it another way, CFC would preclude certain socially responsible activities on the basis that a rival team has already established links in a specific sector.

As well as illuminating the marketing aspect of the CSR programmes CFC choose to establish - them being an extension of brand differentiation - a key ingredient in understanding their approach may be linked to fandom. Note that, aside from desiring uniqueness (something that could, to varying degrees, be assumed of most businesses), and while we the reader may implicitly understand their choice of approach, the club does not justify it by providing the reader with precise reasons why it wishes to avoid adopting similar CSR strategies as other clubs.

It may be assumed that from the author(s) and club’s perspective, and in the context of the report as official documentation of a major football club, the reasons for this approach needn’t be given. Heated rivalry and competition – exercised both physically and symbolically on a weekly basis – are such institutionalised components of ideology and value systems in the organisational environment of professional football that, even in a CSR report, the opposition remain the enemy. It may also suggest the club expect some of the report’s readership to be made up of its fans who share (or possess to an even greater extent) the same mindset.

Indeed, CFC’s confrontational slight upon ‘most football clubs’ that are deemed to ‘take the money and run’ is as explicit as it is damning. The club clearly positions itself on the moral high ground regarding global CSR initiatives with its work in Asia:

‘This is a long term project for us, it’s a critical part of the world of football, and as well as developing Chelsea we want to help develop programmes that are beneficial to all parties and help promote football in these regions. It’s really important for global football that Asian football is developing and then there’s a benefit for everyone.’

Their position is further supported in the report with acknowledgement from Asian Football Confederation chief Mohammad bin Hammam that it is the first instance of a European club introducing itself to the continent as a ‘developer of football in Asia’.

The club goes to great lengths to convince the reader that the partnership is not purely a promotional tactic. Unfortunately, when combined with both explicit and veiled criticism of other clubs’ overseas initiatives, and its own positioning on the moral high ground, a similar result regarding its statements on political interference in football occurs. The way the information is presented partly undermines and compromises the sincerity of CFC’s projection as an ethical organisation.

4.2.6 Defence


Table 7: From ‘Playing a role in football’

‘We believe Chelsea has played an important role in sustaining one of football’s most important economic activities, the transfer market.’

‘Chelsea’s participation in the transfer market has come in for criticism, much of which is unwarranted and ill-informed.’

‘Other than the costs of purchasing the club in 2003, the vast majority of the money Chelsea has spent in the last three years has been directly “invested” in football.’ It has been spent within the game either in the transfer market or in community and academy investment.

‘The transfer market is one of the most important ways in which money filters through and stays in the football pyramid both domestically and globally. And we believe we can demonstrate that this helps sustain, rather than hinders, football as some of our critics would believe.’

‘Given the current debate emanating from European political circles over possible economic interference in football it is important to demonstrate the benefits of the transfer system.’


Table 7 contains the standout excerpts from a section of the report that presents a great deal about CFC’s concerns as a football club and business, regarding reputation and also the communicative, presentational techniques and contextual framing used to project the desired image.

In perceiving the document as somebody who is well-informed and familiar with recent issues within the game, this section is one of the most interesting parts of the report because it appears to be a deliberate, re-active and undeniably bold repost, to a counter-narrative of accusations that have dogged CFC for some time.

Since Abramovich’s takeover and unparalleled financial outlay on new players, the club have been criticised in some circles for their financial impact upon the domestic and, to a lesser extent, continental football scene. This partly derives from envious, less affluent rival clubs and their fans. It is also the result of what has been identified as the destabilising, fee-inflating and monopolising effect that CFC's somewhat ostentatious transfer activity has had on that market.

In the ‘Playing a role in football’ section CFC have chosen, in repost, to include their much-maligned transfer activity under the ‘CSR banner’. Not only do they directly contest criticisms and dismiss detractors, but the club states their financial dealings have had a positive effect by playing a ‘sustaining’ role in the economy of not only the transfer system, but clubs of varying sizes down the ‘football pyramid’. Notably, the projected relationship between CFC and other clubs changes quite significantly in this section from some of its previous guises, to that of solidarity and a ‘family’:

‘Chelsea takes its position within the football family very seriously. We are a proud member of the FA Premier League and recognise the social and economic responsibilities and impacts that come with that, especially as the current champions.’

How well this section of the report works is open to question. There is no uniqueness to be garnered from such statements. Any major football club in the UK could make the claim that it is sustaining the transfer market by paying large sums for players. The system is an accepted reality in world football. Crucially, by incorporating it underneath the umbrella of socially responsible activity and alongside its other programmes, CFC is risking undermining the report, the perceived motivation behind its other work, and alienating its audience.

Deciding to do so also risks the accusation of using a document that is supposed to be about the ethicality of the organisation, to ‘spin’ a preferred image and perception that addresses a particular problem hampering the club. Moreover, it is an issue that has little to do with society at large. Nevertheless, as Prof. Morrow points out:

‘Clubs which are businesses have realised that they have to maintain public confidence in the legitimacy of their operations and business conduct. Whether they do this as an instrumental response to protecting their business or because they understand the social significance of their organisations is a moot point’.

In this context, the section could be seen as explicit instrumental use of the CSR report to meet, counter and ideally remedy an organisational need or problem. If we are to assume the club’s goal for this document is to contribute to its image of responsibility and integrity, one must question whether CFC’s choice of approach is in fact a ‘moot point’, as Morrow states.

Alternatively, while it does appear to weaken the overall message, it raises further questions about CFC’s intentions regarding the report’s purpose, perhaps as a channel for, as Morrow indeed notes, pointedly legitimatising their business conduct.

(All of the above is an excerpt from a dual case study concerning the extent of PR practice in professional football).

Football PR: Making Shirt Sponsorship Score (Part 2)

Continued ...

Brand Equity and Image Awareness


The Manchester United-AIG agreement is an example of a company that has made football sponsorship the prime facet of an integrated marketing communications program, carefully chosen and implemented to meet organisational goals and objectives. For the club, record-breaking income was the primary carrot for partnership and its results to date have been positive.

However, such associations will not always prove as prosperous. Evidence suggests clubs should carry out PR strategies such as environmental analysis to identify and monitor issues and trends which may affect the organisations reputation and relationships (L’Etang, 2006, p. 245), looking beyond the balance sheets, just as their sponsors do, when securing commercial partnerships.

For example, violence and outbreaks of racist chanting in stadiums in various European countries has understandably made current and potential club sponsors nervous about the possible consequences of agreements, as the congruence of image initiated through sponsorship between entity and endorser has implications of each party should representation and public perception deteriorate for either (Shank, 2002, p. 417-19). Simultaneously, companies will clamour to take advantage of natural associations between football and the kind of product that clearly does not fit the branding and image interests of clubs, such as alcohol, to maximise promotional penetration of target audiences. Sponsors hope to acquire the same fan loyalty to their brand of beer by positioning their product in the ‘reservoir of goodwill’ around the club (Madrigal, 2004, p. 252), irrespective of wider repercussions for organisations increasingly aiming to attract younger and family audiences.

An interesting case that illustrates both sides of this coin, as well as an example of crisis management – one of the most common forms of PR and brand management practiced in football (Boyle and Haynes, 2004, p. 223) - is that of Juventus. The ‘Old Lady’ of Italian football often suffers bad press, as do many of Italy’s top clubs, from a conspiracy-hungry and highly critical domestic media, though they enjoy considerable national and global support.

The hugely lucrative agreement with Lybian state-owned oil and energy company Tamoil received notable and somewhat disapproving attention, nationally and particularly abroad, because of its links with the Lybian government and, as part of the deal, the not insignificant level of club control afforded to President Gheddafi. In many ways, the deal simply fuelled the fire of Juventus critics.

However, the tables were turned only a short time into the partnership when Juventus were thrown out of Italian football’s top flight and into its second tier for systematic match-fixing, thereby detrimentally impacting a sponsor that was evidently attempting, through association with a leading club, to increase visibility and enhance their image in the mainstream.

Football’s association with ‘socially stigmatised products’ (McDaniel, Mason and Kinney, 2004, p. 301) such as alcohol is an important issue where adoption and implementation of PR perspectives would be useful. Football clubs and the sport’s wider infrastructure have worked for a long time to overcome the game’s reputation for violence and hooliganism, of which alcohol is considered a key instigator and ‘fuel for disorder’ (McDaniel, Mason and Kinney, 2004, p. 301). In nations such as Denmark alcohol, tobacco and gambling are banned from commercial association with sport (Shank, 2002, p. 419). Undeniably, there are fewer instances of top level British clubs advertising beer on their shirts than 10 years ago, though examples are far from uncommon, not least in Liverpool’s lengthy relationship with Carslberg, and Carling’s sponsorship of Glasgow clubs Celtic and Rangers.

Evidently, in the case of football, there remains a clear discrepancy in approach between short term economic gain and longer term outlook concerning cultivation and integration of a sports organisation’s image (McDaniel, Mason and Kinney, 2004, p. 301).


Fan Equity and Relationship Management


Carn (in Slack and Amis, 2004, p. 281) proclaims that in football the drive for profit that underpins the embrace of sponsorship encourages clubs ‘to erode the emotional bond between club and traditional supporter’.

When considering PR roles in the enhancement of sponsorship deals for the good of football clubs, crucial to an understanding of strategy and practice is the concept of relationship management.

Fans’ perceive their club to be an extension of self (Madrigal, 2004, p. 252), a vital component of their social identity and conception as a group member; in essence a tool of self-definition (Ibid. 2004, p. 240). In a study of relationships between professional sports organisations and their resident cities and fans, among various key benefits expected and enjoyed were improved image, recognition by others beyond local borders, civic identity and pride (Morrow, 1999, p. 177).

Examples in football explicate that clubs are operated as much as representatives and facilitators for wider recognition, promotion and, in some cases, regeneration of an area or group as they are for attaining profit and sporting success. Middlesbrough is one such club in the UK. Run by local businessman Steve Gibson, they are described by the Teesside Development Corporation as a paradigm for the wider rejuvenation of the area (Morrow, 1999, p. 177).

In framing and moulding organisational identity and culture, commercial relations and sponsor agreements can seriously impact upon clubs’ relationships with fans as stakeholders and general public perception, by galvanising or eroding their capacity to serve a social function through some of the aforementioned guises.

Slack and Amis (2004, p. 269-70) are critical of academic research on sponsorship because it is observed and analysed as ‘a neutral, harmless task’, ignoring the underlying inequalities of power, exploitation and domination that shape and mediate key relationships. Moreover, the importance of sporting values with regard to such agreements is frequently usurped by the sponsors desire to be associated with the culture of winning (Slack and Amis, 2004, p. 275).

For the most part, fans have little say in which advertisements they are to be exposed to when supporting their favourite team, live or on television. Nevertheless, they effectively pay for the privilege. Moreover, in Marxist theory, commercial practices such as sponsorship tend to have an alienating effect on spectators who, as a result, become physically passive and non-participatory, consuming sport that takes place only in consumers heads and not on the field of play, in the real world viewed from terraces and stands (Amis and Slack, 2004, p. 281). As a result fan equity – the traditional economic basis of a club – is eroded and the emotional connection between supporter and club, precisely what makes football such a spectacle for fans and sponsors alike, is placed in jeopardy (Ibid).

FC Barcelona (FCB) is an example of a club that understand the value of image and the process of balancing economic and sporting needs. Proud of the fact they have never allowed a sponsor to grace their famous shirts - an emotive marker of brand differentiation in the football world - the symbol of Catalonian nationality understand that such commercial agreements must add and not subtract (Gil-Lafuente, 2006, p. 183) from the sporting, cultural and social equity (essentially what FCB means to its fans) of the club.

Much of the above makes FCB an immensely attractive commercial partner, but the club are eminently mindful of inflaming and alienating over 100,000 members and millions of Catalans, whom in turn are regularly consulted via surveys on major decisions at the club (Gil-Lafuente, 2006, p. 190). It is an example of necessary dialogic communication with the most important stakeholders.

Profound on-field success in recent years led to consideration of a financially rewarding but nevertheless suitable shirt sponsor to capitalise on the club’s high brand equity. Despite a number of offers, the Beijing 2008 Olympics were the only considered partnership in what was expected to be the most lucrative deal in football history. Ultimately, the club opted for an essentially charitable agreement with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). While the deal holds no monetary value, the latter’s currency is an enhancement of FCB’s image by association with an organisation that is congruent with how the club presents itself. It is a partnership that is mutually beneficial and seemingly without blemish or overt compromise.

Due to the club’s aforementioned member structure, it is perfectly acceptable to see FCB as something of a special case, but the analytical approach they take in planning commercial ventures could be adopted by other clubs, for the good of key stakeholders.

McDaniel et al (2004, p. 303) state that in a new era of corporate governance with increasing stakeholder focus, sports organisations may increasingly restrict certain commercial partnerships in order to project an identity of the good corporate citizen. As a sobering counter weight to this view, UK PR mogul Max Clifford states football is only just coming out of the dark ages (in Letang, 2006, p. 221).

A more provocative perception of the issues arising from football sponsorship ventures (also applying to other sports) is that there appears to be a relative differentiation in decision-making at the approach phase, between those sporting organisations that perceive their fandom as an opportunity to increase equity and those who consider fandom to be valuable equity in itself.

Irrespective of the nature of environment, strategic planning at the foundation of PR practice can prove a crucial aid in managing reputation and key relationships, ensuring football clubs maintain their organisational identity in a highly competitive domain, both on and off the field.

Bibliography

Conn, D (2004) The Beautiful Game? Searching for the Soul of Football. London: Yellow Jersey Press.

Boyle, R and Haynes, R (2006) ‘The Football Industry and Public Relations’ in J L’Etang and M Pieczka (eds) Public Relations: Critical Debates and Contemporary Practice. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gil-Lafuente (2007) ‘Marketing management in a socially complex club: Barcelona FC’ in M Desbordes (ed) Marketing & Football: An International Perspective. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd.

L’Etang, J (2006) ‘Public Relations in Sport, Health and Tourism’ in J L’Etang and M Pieczka (eds) Public Relations: Critical Debates and Contemporary Practice. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Madrigal, R (2004) ‘A Review of Team Identification and Its Influence on Consumers’ Responses Toward Corporate Sponsors’ in L Kahle and C Riley (eds) Sports Marketing and the Psychology of Marketing Communication. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

McDaniel, S, Mason, D and Kinney, L (2004) ‘Spectator Sport’s Strange Bedfellows: The Commercial Sponsorship of Sporting Events to Promote Alcohol, Tobacco and Lotteries’ in T Slack (ed) The Commercialisation of Sport. London: Routledge.

Morrow, S (1999) The New Business of Football. Accountability and Finance in Football. London: Macmillan.

Pracejus, J (2004) ‘Seven Psychological Mechanisms Through Which Sponsorship Can Influence Consumers’ in L Kahle and C Riley (eds) Sports Marketing and the Psychology of Marketing Communication. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Shank, M (2002) Sports Marketing: A Strategic Perspective. New York: Prentice Hall.

Slack, T and Amis, J (2004) ‘Money for Nothing and Your Cheques for Free? A Critical Perspective on Sport Sponsorship’ in T Slack (ed) The Commercialisation of Sport. London: Routledge.

Szymanski, S and Kuypers, T (1999) Winners and Losers: The Business Strategy of Football. London: Penguin.

Electronic Reference
‘Man Utd sign 56m AIG shirt deal’. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4882640.stm

Football PR: Making Shirt Sponsorship Score (Part 1)

L’Etang states (2006, p. 243) Public Relations (PR) can contribute to sport in three separate ways; elite sport, wider public participation and promotion as part of healthy living.

In exploring ways in which PR can maximise sponsorship deals, I intend to focus on the domain of elite sport and the current sponsorship environment in professional football, expressly from the perspective of the sporting entity. In doing so, I will focus on its most noticeable, resonant and potentially iconic guise, that of club shirt sponsorship.

In the last decade or so professional football’s increased popularity and swelling economy across most parts of Europe, largely as a result of intense commercialisation and commodification, has transformed the sport into a highly lucrative, globally consumed product that is a magnet for big business.

Sponsorship Research International estimate the sporting arena of the business to be worth close to $20 billion, rising to $50 billion by 2010, in markets that grew by 613% between 1986 and 2002, compared to 127% in sales promotion and 103% in advertising spending (Shank, 2002, p. 402). In professional football, Italian club Juventus currently hold the most lucrative sponsorship deal in the game, a £15m per-year partnership with Libyan oil and energy group Tamoil (BBC News, April 2006), while Manchester United’s 13-year kit deal with Nike worth £303m (Conn, 2004, p. 105) represents the most valuable deal of its kind anywhere in the sport.

Shank (2002, p. 404) defines such examples as investment in a sports entity to support organisational objectives, marketing goals and promotional strategies, where the entity benefits from monetary or product support and the business or partner gains by association with the individual or organisation. A good sponsorship deal can increase sales, heighten awareness, change attitudes and build and maintain relationships with consumers, retaining old markets and reaching new ones (Shank, 2002, p. 401).

However, if such agreements are intended to resemble the veritable ‘perfect wedding’ (Shank, 2002, p. 417) in a business sense, a definition that restricts the sporting entity’s interests to capital injection and product supply fails to recognise the concept and importance of brand equity and organisational identity, and the extent both may be affected by association with the sponsoring party.


Public Relations and Football


Boyle and Haynes argue (2006, p. 239) that in a climate where increased commercial activity and global promotional ventures can run contrary to the emotional and cultural aspects of fandom that are required to retain fan bases, clubs would show good business acumen by paying greater attention to fan relations. This is because communication with key stakeholders is liable to become more important, with effective, proactive and committed PR strategies integral to the process, though their embedment may be met with significant challenges and barriers resulting from current attitudes and operational norms of practice.

In stark contrast to the commercial explosion and proliferation of sponsorship, creating a more complex communicative landscape where clubs must engage with a wider range of groups, stakeholders and publics due to changes in the football economy, PR remains relatively absent in the domain with practice largely limited to corporate hospitality (Boyle and Haynes, 2006, p. 223), publicity and media relations conducted through traditional channels of communication (Shank, 2002, p. 391).

Unlike financial PR carried out by clubs that, in becoming Plc’s, have communication strategies forced upon them when managing sensitive financial information, and political PR’s vital presence in the work pf governing bodies acutely aware of their need to manage media relations, given the extent of scrutiny paid to their actions as administrations’ that are responsible for the health and public image of the game, the concept of strategic PR at club level is a relatively new and unevenly developed premise that lacks recognition (Boyle and Haynes, 2006, p. 225).

In spite of this, issues surrounding relations between corporate sponsors and clubs, not least due to the levelling out of television rights income, is likely to evolve with implications for PR activity (Boyle and Haynes, 2006, p. 238).

By providing current examples, I intend to deduce the extent to which clubs can and do consider merely the effect of association with a name, beyond the financial benefit it brings, concerning the very different currency of club reputation, identity and representation, and the resulting communicative and stakeholder issues arising in the modern game.

In doing so, I will expound how PR approaches in the strategic planning stage may maximise the benefit of sponsorship in this sense, avoiding potential danger and damage to the club by ensuring business partnerships do not run contrary to ‘the development of communication vision, mission, aim and measurable objectives to support organisational goals’ (L’Etang, 2006, p. 245).

I will begin by presenting a brief history of sponsorship in football, specifically in the UK, discussing some of the key issues, approaches, structural and operational norms within the sport, in turn relating examples to sport sponsorship approaches and debates more generally.

Football Sponsorship


Sponsorship was strongly resisted by football authorities in the UK because an explicit commercial intervention into the game was considered demeaning. The Football Association and UEFA’s (European football’s governing body) banning of the practice ensured the many offers were consistently rebuffed by clubs, but sponsorship arrived in the late seventies and proliferated the following decade as authorities submitted largely as means of allowing clubs to survive football’s financial crisis at the time. 1982 saw the first competition sponsor in the UK, as an agreement with the public national dairy company saw the English League Cup become the Milk Cup, an early example of awareness and action regarding suitable product associations with sport, in contrast to its common linkages with alcohol, tobacco and gambling (discussed later).

The dramatic increase in football’s popularity and economy in the 1990’s saw sponsorship move beyond shirts to stadiums and even club names. The continued flow of capital into the game and intensified commercial links have been accompanied by a growth in companies involved in the promotion of football and sponsorship, as well as market research and brand management, while PR has been utilised to maximise such agreements, in turn involving collaboration with specialist sponsorship management agencies such as Craigie Taylor International (CTI) (Boyle and Haynes, 2006, p. 222). The creation of Hill and Knowlton’s specialist sports marketing and sponsorship division and Ketchum’s Sports Network exemplify how many PR agencies diversified into football as commercialisation increased, where central to their remit is the generation of greater awareness and value from sponsor relations held by clubs (Boyle and Haynes, 2006, p. 227.)

Today, sponsorship in football, as is the case in American sports, is reaching saturation point, where consumers begin to pay less attention to individual product and company associations due to perceived sponsorship clutter, ensuring a need for more systematic, strategic programs to stand out from the crowd (Shank, 2002, p. 403).

Pracejus states (2004, p. 175) that despite the extent of literature on sponsorship in sports marketing texts, there exists little empirical and conceptual work addressing how sponsorship actually works in terms of influencing consumers. The author presents seven chronological processes through which audiences are engaged, ranging from simple awareness of the sponsor, the transferring of positive feelings from sporting event to brand through association, to a wholesale image transfer whereby the brand becomes like the team (Pracejus, 2004, p. 179).

Crucially, image transfer works best when a brand has fewer sponsorship programs and less widespread visibility. A single, exclusive partnership with a sporting organisation or event that has a strong brand image ensures the sponsor establishes heightened abstract association with the entity (Pracejus, 2004, p. 178).

In football, some clubs retain iconic status and an immensely resonant image largely irrespective of success, such as Manchester United and Liverpool in the UK (Szymanski and Kuypers, 199, p. 68). A pertinent example of the benefits of a single sponsorship association is evident in Manchester United’s most recent shirt partnership, the most lucrative in British football history (£56m over 4 years), with insurance company AIG. The latter benefit from a strong association thanks to lower visibility elsewhere. The inherent exclusivity allows for the maximising of positive image association with the recently crowned champions of the English Premiership.

To be continued ...

FC Barcelona - Mas Que En Club: Entertaining Politics in the Ultimate Fan Democracy (Part 3)

Continued ...

The immense passion shown by FCB followers is mirrored elsewhere on the continent, but ‘Los Cules’ (the fans collective nickname) are unique in their plurality. Women, children and immigrants are amidst the cavernous stadium each week, while government officials comment on affairs of club as if they were affairs of state (Foer, 2004. p.195).

In this sense, the club serves as a binding tool, a leveller of certain societal structures and dissolver of diasporas, as various groups come together to (as stressful and heart-wrenching as it may be) enjoy the performance.

Such events represent a typical locus of social capital that is deemed by Puttnam as the backbone for people’s capacity to engage in the public sphere and participate in political activity (in van Zoonen, 2004, p. 62). Fans comment, reflect, advise and evaluate, often culminating in a concerted, collective, organised movement to achieve a desired goal for the greater good, in this case, FCB.

Admittedly, the above is a well-ordered and reasoned summation of fan activity. The emotionally-tumultuous experiences and actions in Barcelona bars and on the stands of Nou Camp can certainly be considered highly irrational at times, encapsulated neatly and amusingly in Richards’ description of a sophisticated contemporary discourse of emotionality and emotionalisation, ‘… complex and multilayered, and at times contradictory and obscure. It is therefore not always easily observed or understood ‘(2004, p. 346). But precisely such a discourse is required to ensure underestimation of such activities is avoided.

Undoubtedly, to observe and successfully gauge the inherent political participatory relevance and civic transferability of FCB fandom is a complex process. A more limited intellectual framework may understandably result in the common perception of, as Richards notes, ‘a carnivalesque festival of pure expression or catharsis’. However, the relationship between feeling and reason is one of complementarity and interconnection, ‘to invite emotional engagement is to facilitate rational discourse, not banish it’ (2004, p. 340–342).

Berezin’s observations on the political significance of rituals and symbolic processes are especially pertinent. In this context, FCB fandom can be considered an exercise in the production of belief, ideology and identity. Grounded in historical problems (in this case Fascism and national subversion), people (here Catalans) utilise this ritual of support and dedication to a defining institution as means of linkage between contemporary cultural conditions with ideology and practice (1997, p. 373).

Careful study of culturally-specific nuances within the mantra of the dedicated FCB fan illuminates how political backdrops play a crucial role in articulations between club and support.

Overwhelmingly emotive political substance is ingrained into local fandom. The result is often a translation into non-linear, contradictory and multi-layered behaviour by (what we have seen described as) the supposedly mindless, frivolous ‘fan’. The complex end result is antithetical to the basic premise and true spirit of sport. Many of FCB’s most dedicated fans harbour an enemy within. There is an in-built secret yearning for the team to fail.

“Catalan’s don’t want Barca to win,” says a leading local journalist, “if they did, they wouldn’t enjoy being victims so much” (in Foer, 2004, p. 205). Critics and rivals claim the socios et al like to cry over their perceived victimisation. This is because FCB fans over recent decades carry with them a ‘guilty survivor’ complex. It is a feeling of inadequacy and shame, resulting in a hidden habit of self-reproach, all due to the struggles endured by the club and its fans in the past from which the modern supporting contingent is now free.

For such fans, cheering their beloved team can be a torturous affair, full of inner conflict, because of the political, social and cultural significance it entails, to the extent that not even victory, the ultimate purpose of any sport, is what it seems.

So the political backdrop is crucial to fan interaction, in turn demanding a more open-ended appreciation of precisely why such fans attend these matches, and what they obtain from the experience.

Richards states the relationship between people and politics has changed to represent more a mode of consumption (2004, p. 341). Certainly, if we consider sport as product (increasingly the case today), what the FCB faithful consume is laden with the political, as well as the entertaining. It is politics interwoven with, or as popular culture.

Moreover, the pallet of this consumption is an overly emotional one, akin to the kind of rarely-delivered emotionalised experiences people increasingly seek from politics, which invariably showcases political communication’s emotional deficit (Richards, 2004, p. 40).

As part of the horde of international fans, while less socially and personally resonant, Foer explicates the attractive powers of FCB’s political significance as ‘the discreet charm of bourgeois nationalism’ (2004, p. 193). Again regarding the object of consumption, global fans baring no national or cultural ties whatsoever to the club, or its past, nevertheless display strong commitment and intoxicating addiction to FCB, its values and non-sporting meaningfulness therein.

It ensures the club stands out in a crowd of more successful rivals. While similar levels of political participation, articulation and consumption do not apply here, it is very evident that, for fans across the globe, much of my previous analysis of FCB translates as entertaining politics.

As successful means of further research, points highlighted in the works of Eliasoph (1990) and Wyatt et al (2000) are applicable to a possible framework of understanding the political and civic participatory capacities and articulations involved in sport fandom.

Informal political conversation is a vital and often neglected component of political life (Wyatt, 2000, p. 71), requiring greater recognition. As a public, social, national and political institution, FCB is an ideal candidate for such a study. The Nou Camp is the typically busy, noisy setting, removed from traditional arenas and modes of political discussion (Eliasoph, 1990, p. 467), but where people invariably ‘do’ politics. Analysis of fan discussion and interaction in the stands would be enlightening.

The case study also echoes Wyatt’s inclination towards the politics of the street, at ground level, melding with everyday conversations and issues – truly appreciating which must preclude the separation of public from private, and political from personal (2000, p. 73).

Eliasoph’s work on political culture and the presentation of politics is based on the agreed premise that people have little faith in politics, a sentiment I vehemently question. It is not the human experience of politics that people have become disillusioned and disengaged with, but formal politics, of institutions, the political process.

In this context, hugely successful (political) institutions like FCB provide a positive and progressive message about the political lives of people which must not be ignored simply because it resides outside traditional spheres of formal politics.

Ideally, as van Zoonen states, the substantial physical, psychological (etc, etc) investment people dedicate to such entities may be able to set political participatory mechanisms into motion (2004, p. 56), thus enhancing political citizenship, a healthy (meaning thoroughly active) democracy, resulting in societal civic vitality.

Popular culture and politics, quite evidently, become civically fallible and devoid of meaning when approached, accepted and dismissed as if they are mutually exclusive entities.

Entertaining politics is most certainly evident. Equally, popular culture requires acknowledgement as a relevant resource for political citizenship, which could contribute to the enrichment of politics, greater levels of public inclusion, and an engaged and motivated society able to thrive in their performance as citizens.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baum, M.A. (2003). ‘Soft news and political knowledge: evidence of absence, or absence of evidence’. Political Communication 20 (2), p 173-190.

Berezin, M. (1997). Politics and culture, a less fissured terrain. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, p. 361- 383.

Cloonan, M. & Street, J. (1998). ‘Rock the vote. Popular Culture and Politics’. Politics 18 (1), p. 33-38.

Coleman, S. (2003). A Tale of Two Houses. The House of Commons, the Big Brother House and the People at home. London: Hansard Society.

Eliasoph, N. (1990). Political culture and the presentation of a political self:
a study of the public sphere in the spirit of Erving Goffman. Theory and Society, 19, 465-494.

Foer, F (2004) How Soccer Explains The World: an (unlikely) theory of globalization. New York: HarperCollins.

Gans-Boriskin, R. & Tisinger, R. (2005). ‘The Bushlet Administration: terrorism and war on The West Wing’. Journal of American Culture 28 (1), p. 100 – 113.

Graber D. (2003). ‘The media and democracy: Beyond myths and stereotypes’. Annual Review of Political Science 6, p.139-160.

Postman, N. (1985). Amusing ourselves to death. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc.

Prior, M. (2003). ‘Any news in soft news? The impact of soft news preferences on political knowledge’. Political Communication 20 (2), p. 149 – 171.

Richards, B. (2004). The emotional deficit in political communication. Political Communication, 21(3), p. 339- 352.

Schudson, M. (2001). Politics as a cultural practice. Political Communication, 18(4), p. 421 – 431.

Tonn & Petrich (1998). ‘Everyday life constraints on citizenship in the US.’ Futures 30 (8), p. 783-813.

Wyatt, R. O., Katz, E., & Kim, J. (2000). Bridging the spheres: political and personal conversation in public and private spaces. Journal of Communication, 50(1), 71-92.

van Zoonen, L. (2004). Entertaining the citizen: when politics and popular culture converge. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.

FC Barcelona - Mas Que En Club: Entertaining Politics in the Ultimate Fan Democracy (Part 2)

Continued ...

Evidently, a hybrid discourse of politics that values the emotional as well as the rational, and also through the non-traditional means referred to, is desirable.

Citizens invest vast amounts of physical and intellectual energy into popular culture and entertainment, so the idea of having ‘entertaining citizenship’ could have positive participatory consequences for the political process, and democracy.

The removal of emotion from politics is highly problematic, nonsensical and a largely mythical concept. Moreover, politics has to battle for people’s spare time amid a host of other diversions - such as sport and institutions like FCB, described by Franklin Foer as ‘God’s greatest gift to leisure time’ (2004, p. 194).

Such a task may prove insurmountable, but the oppositional structure is a sizeable barrier. By separating itself from entertainment, politics risks alienation from the everyday life of citizens.

Manuel Vazquez Montalban, a great contemporary writer of Spain, described FCB unflinchingly as ‘the epic weapon of a country without a state’ (in Foer, 2004, p.195). Certainly, this provocative observation requires some qualification.

The study of FCB may be appreciated on two levels. Research herald’s meaningful findings regarding the themes and perspectives discussed in this paper which may in turn be applied to most leading football clubs, nay sporting institutions in general, and their fans.

Additionally, the distinct peculiarities engulfing the 107 year-old club and the evident contrasts with equally-esteemed peers in the football world moves us a step closer to demonstrating how the political can be interwoven and wired into the emotional circuitry of the popular culture (Richards, 2004, p. 349).

Crucially, effective understanding of the observations made relies upon an open perception of politics, unrestricted by what we consider traditional forms and channels, but rather to appreciate the human experience of politics. To draw an artistic analogy, this analytical approach is based on Schudson’s stated principle of ‘drawing what you see’ (2001, p. 422), irrespective of predisposed theory, frames and form.

Firstly, I will expand upon FCB’s institutional peculiarities which are anchored by entrenched historical, political and ideological factors. Secondly, I will explore the complicated social and political caveats within fan interaction.

The basis of FCB’s relevance to the subject of entertainment’s relationship with politics is rooted in what the club means to, and how it is utilized by, people.

AC Milan’s Silvio Berlusconi and Chelsea’s Roman Abramovich are but two names among a host of wealthy and powerful business and trade giants, oil moguls, food merchants and media entrepreneurs that control major football clubs across Europe. These institutions are immersed in the world of commerce and sponsorship and are often part of larger non-sporting conglomerates. This is one of many instances where FCB stands out in marked contrast.

The ‘Blaugrana’ are owned and controlled by their fans. The ‘socios’ (the season ticket holders) vote for the club president during organized elections involving televised campaigns and candidate debates. Moreover, the club’s social resonance and significance as a cultural object in Barcelona ensures the highly lucrative temptation of shirt sponsorship is continually resisted. No company has been deemed sufficiently worthy to, as diehard fans would perceive, besmirch the sacred team colours worn by the players. It is symbolic of the emotional connection between fan and club, further highlighted by the very vocal ideological pressures placed upon those representing FCB on-field.

Coleman’s exploration of the reality television show Big Brother draws comparisons between the object of study and politics in that both are representation games. Fans feel represented by an entity (be it an individual, group, organization or institution) that represents who they are in the world, their reality as they experience it (2003, p. 30).

The fan community assemble, like political constituencies, as a result of performance (van Zoonen, 2004, p. 53), and make their judgements accordingly.

Just as FCB feels compelled to exhibit its purity and authenticity in resisting commercial overtures, a certain sporting ethos and style of play – to entertain – is demanded by its fans. Romance is priority, ahead of success and ultimate victory. As a result, extreme pressure quickly turns to castigation and rejection for those players and coaches who fail to deliver this very particular remit.

The club’s ideology and clear sense of mission ensures it has become much more than a sporting organisation, but rather the defining institution of Catalan nationalism (Foer, 2004, p. 194). The real strength of public attachment has historical derivatives from the arena of politics.

FCB bares a leftist political leaning, again in contrast to most peers. Founded by the Swiss Joan Gamper, the club’s past guise as heroic centre of resistance to Francoist fascism is written into local lore, the Nou Camp being the only place for Catalans to speak out against their oppressors, with safety in numbers. Becoming a worker’s collective in the thirties, the prominence of FCB support was perceived as an articulation of heated opposition against centralised Castilian government, anti-Catalan legislation and the power of Madrid, encapsulated in the hatred of its strongest symbol, Real Madrid (favourites of Franco himself) (Foer, 2004, p. 201).

The resulting retribution for heated Catalan resistance not only involved numerous deaths, banning of flags and purging of the Catalan language from the public sphere, but a declared war on FCB itself. Intermittently shut down and its name changed to Castilian Spanish, on entering Catalonia the club was fourth on Franco’s list of institutions to dismantle after communists, anarchists and separatists (Foer, 2004, p. 204)

These factors may be less pertinent to the club’s and fans identity today, but a poignant legacy remains. It is difficult, as an informed observer and leaving aside typical methods and traditional intellectual frameworks (Schudson, 2001, p. 422), to perceive FCB without its politics. Equally, it is eminently possible, in this context, to perceive FCB followers not simply as groups of fans, but fundamentally ‘social formations’ (van Zoonen, 2004, p. 50) with a visible political tenor that is integral to their fan persona.

In this sense such fandom may be considered, as Schudson’s work explicates, politics in the guise of cultural practice, evident in the values, meanings, and symbolic significance of interaction with the entity of support (2001, p. 423).

Quite clearly, while the 90 000 fans packed into Nou Camp celebrate goals and cheer for points they are also part of a movement, embracing a set of values. It resembles Schudson’s description of early voting practices in the United States. They are acts of social solidarity, about belief in the cause (2001, p. 424).

This can apply to most sports fans, but with such entrenched cultural and social significance, ‘the cause’ is of heightened importance to ‘Barca’ supporters.

To be concluded ...

FC Barcelona - Mas Que En Club: Entertaining Politics in the Ultimate Fan Democracy (Part 1)

Sport represents one of the greatest forces in the sphere of entertainment when it comes to the mass mobilization of citizens.

Avid followers of a particular sport (or institution therein) represent some of the most loyal and vociferous groups in all fandom - thoroughly embroiled in the entity of their support and affection. Yet this highly emotive and ritualistic relationship is often undervalued, with research on its cultural and political significance seriously undernourished.

Stereotyped as mindless followers of actors, objects or institutions, the common modernist representation of all fandom dismisses any civic relevance or consequence - their actions bereft of any capacity for the betterment of society.

Moreover, this view is especially true concerning sport. In contrast to other forms of entertainment - film, television, even popular music - the interwoven meanings, values and ideologies at play during audience interaction in the sporting arena are underestimated. In media, sport has been described as the ‘toy department’ of journalism.

However, Berezin’s study of the political significance of cultural objects undermines this perception. We may perceive works of art as examples of political dissidence or enacting freedom and identity, anthems and flags represent resonant aesthetic components and together may function as vehicles of national identity, history and tradition, helping to forge political commitment and confidence (1997, p. 372-373). As I will show, the sporting arena exhibits similar symbolic strengths and sociological potency.

The belittlement of sport’s cultural and civic value risks a serious miscalculation of its societal significance. It risks residing, wrongly, under the umbrella of what Neil Postman would consider entertainment to (or ought to) be. That is to say a politically weightless and essentially frivolous domain.

There are parallels to be drawn here with sport’s perceived purpose in ancient Rome as a tool of maintaining hegemony. There it worked to keep the people happy and distracted with ‘bread and the games’, cultivating civic inactivity and discouraging political discussion, while also functioning as a controlled manifestation of tribal, warring desires. While some of these perceptions are antiquated, others still resonate. Football supporters are among the most emotional of fans. They chant and cheer in stadiums across the world for goals, tackles, victories and trophies. Are their actions civically passive and politically insignificant?

I intend to show that these indulgences of leisure time also exhibit distinct political, cultural and ideological particularities that require analytical attention.

This is because sport’s prominence in modern society cannot be ignored. It is inextricably linked to politics, irrespective of constant claims by politically distrustful sporting actors that the two should be kept apart. Deep-rooted social and cultural facets are exhibited through various symbolisms in sport. National, regional and local identities, as well as race and gender, are ingrained into fans interaction with their teams and performers.

Moreover, not only is sport a hugely lucrative business, but the two move ever closer as politicians align themselves with teams and personalities to, as soul legend James Brown once claimed regarding equivalencies in the pop music world, ”command the love of the people” (in van Zoonen, 2005, p46) while sporting heroes like Liberian footballer George Weah (albeit unsuccessfully) run for national presidency.

I have chosen the increasingly glamorous world of professional football as my field of analysis. The glamour aspect is especially significant considering the comparative peculiarities of my case study – Futbol Club de Barcelona (FCB). It fits neatly with the sentiment of recognising the importance of sport as more than just a game. The words Mas que un club are emblazoned on the team’s crest to the chagrin of many rivals – ‘More than a club’.

The newly crowned European Champions are one of the world’s leading lights in fame and support terms, but not success. The latter factor is telling. Few clubs could sustain the illogical duplicity of avid global fandom and a comparatively paltry trophy cabinet. This is because there is much more to FCB than winning football matches – the club is a both a social and political institution.

FCB is an ideal object of study because it affords plentiful opportunity to showcase how political and civic factors are ingrained into the performance of fans. Moreover, this also becomes a vital aspect of the entertainment value.

Theoretical Basis

To what extent is politics part of the process of human/fan involvement in sport? More qualitatively, I will also consider possible results. What does it mean for political participation, can it contribute to political engagement and citizenship in a positive way?

The theoretical approach to this study is based on the premise that entertainment can (and does) both amuse and help society function. Exploring the feasibility of a measurable, legitimate and mutually beneficial relationship between entertainment, the political sphere and citizenship is the ultimate aim of this work.

Historically, entertainment has been considered incompatible with politics, political participation and so a healthy democracy. Before digesting some of the leading perspectives on this subject, consideration of contextual factors is important. As well as the aforementioned perception of entertainment’s place in media and society, we must consider more broadly what makes a healthy society, with active citizens and a productive public sphere.

Modern media convergences in genre, content, form and sociological significance have seen wider recognition of the proliferation of uses for (and ways of thinking about) media texts. The idea of what people do with the media (not vice versa) is at the heart of this discussion. I consider a more refined understanding of the role of entertainment in peoples’ lives to be eminently necessary.

Neil Postman’s acclaimed and hugely popular Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985) laments the deluge of entertainment consumed by a politically disengaged and civically passive public, through the medium of television. His view can be equated with a modernist perspective that champions core values of rationality, progress and the universal truth.

Echoed in Postman’s strong juxtaposition of television with print media, the former is deemed by modernists as the leading mode of communication that, in the past, produced informed, active and engaged citizens capable of serious political discourse. Postman castigates television for working against news and politics, by creating a world where information and subsequent reflection and understanding is submerged by the frivolity of entertainment.

Critics of the modernist perspective view its advocates as essentially elitist because the idyllic vision of the citizen they create is an unrealistic goal for the average person. Accusations of harbouring a highly nostalgic view of the past are also levelled, of a mythical time of intellectual and cultural vibrancy now dissolved in the apparent contemporary media malaise.

Bruce Tonn & Carl Petrich (1998) highlight the daily constraints people face in attempting to be good citizens, which is directly related to the idea of the unrealistically perfect citizen. Populations face a host of daily obstacles preventing ideal civic participation that cannot be attributed to failing media, while Doris Graber (2003) questions the realism of expecting the media to fulfil a role of sustaining democracy.

Liesbet van Zoonen (2004) vigorously challenges the separation of entertainment and, more specifically, emotion from politics. The emotion-rationality dichotomy is a commonplace and crucial theme when determining entertainment’s constructive usage in civic society and citizenship. On a quintessentially human level, it is a useful and tangible parallel to the entertainment-politics axis.

Emotion is frequently belittled when equated with politics. This is neatly encapsulated by use of the ‘Soap Opera’ metaphor - a genre of television based on emotional interaction and involvement - commonly used as a derogatory descriptor for actions and events deemed shallow, frivolous and devoid of meaning, purpose and importance. In sport and football fandom, this is especially relevant.

Watching a match live or televised is an emotionally tumultuous experience in most cases. The sport cultivates this behaviour. Fans cheer their team on, hoping for the ultimate satisfaction – something that is a comparatively rare occurrence when likened to other sports – scoring. Shots, misses, the building of momentum and the eventual rippling of the net resemble a highly changeable and often irrational emotional rollercoaster that can end in a chaotic, gleefully Dionysian eruption. Postman would not approve.

This dismissal of soaps represents the relatively unitary view of emotion’s uselessness in a well-ordered, progressive society – a perspective deemed by critics as highly masculine, culturally elitist and self-serving.

Popular music’s relationship with politics and television genres such as infotainment and drama represent avenues to investigate the role of entertainment (beyond solely amusement) as a means of political, civic and democratic participation by audiences.

Utilising pop music with the slant on political participation is encouraging because it may prove a method of engaging youth into the political sphere. The dangers of trivialisation are evident here. Martin Cloonan & John Street’s studies (1998) suggest that pop music can have that effect on politics.

However, harnessing its power to enhance desires of civic involvement in the young is an attractive premise that requires committed study. Apathetic response to and alienation from the political process can be perceived as a result of feelings of submission and exclusion to and from politics – the young being the object of policy that they (at least feel) have no say in forming.

Similarly to sport, pop music and politics become evermore intertwined as political parties associate themselves with popular groups for marketing and image purposes, while pop stars increasingly champion political causes with their fame as platform, such as Bono and Bob Geldof.

However, the fans of pop music – the individuals to which pop music probably means the most – are marginalised or completely removed from the deliberations about issues and debates concerning it.

Theorists such as van Zoonen (2003) highlight how pop music appreciation involves an emotional, non-verbal mode of expression, one that has yet to be harnessed and included in an overly ‘rational’ public sphere. It represents a stark example of how the potential and relevance of entertainment and popular culture remains unrealised by the establishment.

Infotainment or ‘soft news’ represents a clear-cut merging of information and the political sphere with entertainment. An object of much dismay, such as the views of Markus Prior (2003), for framing news and informational content in a manner that betrays the audience’s capacity to learn, it instead produces a pseudo-knowledgeable public. Prior sees such shows as an obstacle to an informed electorate, and infotainment is deemed incapable of promoting democracy.

The issue of making politics interesting, or entertaining politics, is pertinent here. Theorist Matthew Baum (2003) sees infotainment as a useful and necessary tool amid such competitive pressure and consumer choice. Through it, a proportion of society that would not normally consume, for instance, foreign policy news may do so through the ‘piggy-backing’ of news and information with entertainment.

So, entertainment provides accessibility for news and politics. Though the ‘soft news’ format may not promote extensive knowledge, it allows audiences to form opinions on important issues that would otherwise be lost. The civic value of emotion is important here. Consumers of soft news tend to react emotionally to what they see and form opinions based predominantly on moral judgements. This, it may be argued, provides people with some capacity to fulfil the role of a good citizen.

Similarly, television drama can contribute to political participation and an informed citizenry through its subject matter. The West Wing is seen to confront ideological tensions and anxieties in the U.S. political sphere. It could certainly be seen to make ‘politics’ entertaining.

Rachel Gans-Boriskin & Russ Tissinger (2005) highlight that the show’s pro-political consequences are questionable. Still, while labelled unrealistic and a liberal fantasy by critics, others see the drama in an informative guise for the politically unengaged viewer. The West Wing explores facets of politics that are invisible to most of us when politics appears in the media. Thus, it attempts to represent a behind-the-scenes, chaotic look at the world of politics.

More crucially, dramas usually work through romantic narratives, visual aesthetics and symbolism – to elicit emotional responses. From a modernist perspective, this precludes drama from aiding politics and citizenship. However, as the line between fiction and reality is blurred in such texts, analysis requires us to think carefully about the affect of pertinent subject-specific drama on individual perception.

To be continued ...

La Liga Nicknames: Knowing Your Cules From Your Elbow

The Spanish game is awash with a variety of nicknames for clubs. They can be highly amusing, wholly derogatory, steeped in history and bizarre in the extreme.

My work is one in progress, and far from infallible. Native Spanish speakers - feel free to comment with corrections and pointers – refining loose translations and filling in blanks that have resulted from a clutch of research dead-ends.

Now, I am no Spanish linguist (as you are about to find out, to my shame) but that’s the point. This article is for people like me – culture seekers who simply have to know this stuff, an albeit marginal step up from mastering how to order two San Miguels.

History, Colours and Convenience

The most common dictator of nickname attribution in world football is undoubtedly colour, but they are often one of many (and not always the most common) namesakes.The dominance of colour is no truer than in the world’s most famous club, Real Madrid. Los Merengues acquired their name for this reason, but the roots are quite pragmatic - not as a symbol of purity or peace but after a popular white candy. The Bernabeu behemoths were also once referred to as the Vikings by the more radical fans, due to their importing of exotic foreign personnel from northern Europe and Scandinavia, when the ban on overseas players was lifted in the 1970s.

A comparison with Real’s hated cross-town rivals Atletico Madrid illuminates the recurring theme of how identities of close rivals shape a club’s sense of itself. Atletico were simultaneously known as the Indians, again for their recruitment of foreign stars, this time from South America. Still, Los Colchoneros is their most prominent staple, the ‘mattress-makers’. This is another common theme – a question of convenience. Red and white cloth was readily available, used frequently as wrap for mattresses, and so affordable for the clubs to acquire.

Atletico were founded by Basque students and, at least initially, considered to be a branch of Athletic Bilbao, hence the red and white strip. Both clubs began in blue and white, but switched largely due to the aforementioned cost benefits. So Athletic are sometimes referred to as the Rojiblancos, but most famously and interestingly as Los Leones – the Lions. The club has British origins, evident in the title ‘Athletic’, but the nickname is steeped in local lore. The club’s San Mames ground is named after the nearby church, which in turn is named after an early Christian who was thrown to the Lions. It is said the beasts refused to attack, and Mames was later made a saint. Perhaps a likeness to somewhat picky and evidently ineffectual cats seems a strange identity to adopt, but the club’s notoriously resolute home form and bruising reputation certainly vindicates the choice.

Athletic’s own local rivals Real Sociedad play in the latter’s original kit and are known as Los Txuri-Urdin, white and blue in the local Guipuzcoan Basque – a specific dialect from the Donostia area of the region. Colour is equally prevalent in the self-explanatory Submarino Amarillo of Villarreal, while the red jerseys of both Real Mallorca and Osasuna (which is local Basque dialect for ‘Health’) are the basis of their nicknames, Los Bermellones and Los Rojillos respectively, albeit with some linguistic variation.

Some visual signifiers are far less obvious of course because times and circumstances change. Los Periquitos (the Parakeets) of Espanyol acquired their name due, again, to factors of cost and convenience. The club’s first strip stood out, to say the least. They now play in blue and white stripes, but the players first donned bright yellow jerseys with the colour of the shorts left to the individual. A friend of club founder Angel Rodriguez owned a textile factory. He had surplus stock of yellow material which the latter gladly put to good use.

Real Zaragoza are Los Blanquillos, due to their white jerseys, but many hardcore and older fans of the Spanish game will point to Los Magnificos as the club’s most famous pseudonym. This was during a period of great success in the 1960s when the club boasted the awesome frontline of Canario, Santos, Marcelino, Villa and Lapetra – reaching four consecutive cup finals and triumphing in Europe.

Quirks, Jokes and Insults

Some team names need a lot of explaining and don’t always make much sense initially. Nicknames are also regularly adopted by the most loyal and loving of fans even though the observations were originally meant as insults from rival supporters, often with geographical, cultural and racial undertones.

Celta Vigo are known as the ‘little Celts’, Celtinas, rooted in the existence of Celtic settlements in Galicia over 1000 years ago (Galicia has Celtic etymology, referring to Gaul - what we now know as France, before German colonization). However, they are also referred to as Los Portugueses by Deportivo La Coruna fans who, in response, are labelled Los Turcos by the Celta faithful. Coastal Vigo is the most westerly Liga outfit, residing just above the Portuguese border. Coruna is further north, and the fans of Superdepor (as the club is most commonly known) have embraced this perception to their hearts – you can often see Turkish flags held aloft at the Riazor stadium.

Similarly, Sevilla are given the title of Los Palanganas (the Basins) by Real Betis fans, though it is not embraced with such warmth by the Estadio Sanchez Pizjuan faithful. As well as the Sevillistas (a common variation on the club name which fans of many sides adopt) they are often referred to as the Biris, after a Gambian player Biri-Biri who wore the red and white jersey in the 1970s. Betis themselves are often labelled Los Pepinos, the cucumbers or peppers, for their green and white strip and the popularity of the ingredient in local cuisine.

One of the most commonly used club nicknames in Spanish football is that of Valencia, and it is rather difficult to explain - Los Che. Grammatically, ‘che’ is a Spanish interjection - a word added to a sentence to convey emotion, usually followed with an exclamation mark. The term is heard more in South America, but also in Valencia (though it would, more locally, be written as a Valencian ‘xe’ or, in Catalonian, ‘xa’). The term is used to get attention or invoke surprise, like the English ‘Hey!’, or in a more facile, conversational sense can mean friend/mate/buddy. So a direct translation would describe Valencia as the Ches team, the guys’ team, though whether that is a correct perception of the nickname is open to question.

We finish with the club currently at the top of the tree, the team you would perhaps expect to sport a nickname of deep rooted historical and cultural significance, fitting for a region as supportive of their club as they are defensive of their Catalonian identity. Barcelona’s name derives from, quite literally, your ass – Los Cules.‘Cul’ means exactly that, your backside, so in plural the name the Blaugrana (which refers to their strip) supporters endorse is ‘the arses’. The reason is simple, and it stuck. In the early 20th century Barca’s stadium was, reportedly, notable because passers-by could see the rears of fans sitting in the upper stand. Thus the phrase was coined and has now attached itself to the famous institution of FC Barcelona for ever more.